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Introduction
O n May 29, 2006, Komnas Perempuan, the Indonesian National Com-mission that advocates for the rights of women, met with a delegationof nineteen women survivors of the 1965–1966 anti-Communist vio-
lence to consider their official complaint. The moment was historic: these
women officially broke their silence of forty years. Between 1965 and
1968, they had been the victims of horrible acts of violence committed
by other Indonesians, their neighbors, colleagues, and even friends. Par-
ticipating in para-military and vigilante groups, the perpetrators had mur-
dered between half and one million Indonesians and incarcerated more
than one million. Accused of harboring Communist sympathies or being
active members of the party, many of these women spent decades in jail.
For forty years, the Suharto government had forbidden any mention of
their plight. Their local communities, at times even their own families,
had ostracized them. They had been demonized based on their direct,
indirect, or alleged involvement in the Indonesian Communist Party
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(Partei Kommunis Indonesia or PKI). The rationale for the massacres,
incarceration, and silence was that Communists polluted Indonesian soci-
ety and made the country impure. By virtue of their gender, women were
especially susceptible to allegations of impurity, which gave their adver-
saries permission to rape and sexually abuse them.
Komnas Perempuan is an abbreviation that stands for Komisi
Nasional Anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan (The National Commission
against Violence against Women).1 A government-sponsored organization,
it was set up on October 15, 1998, after the collapse of the oppressive
Suharto regime (1966–1998). When in the spring of 1998, during the tran-
sition period from dictatorship to democracy, large-scale communal riots
erupted, many women were sexually assaulted.2 This was not the first
time such patterns of violence and sexual assault had occurred. It had
been an open secret that during military operations the regime’s security
forces violated human rights on a staggering scale. Military personnel tar-
geted women in places the government considered rebellious, such as
Aceh, Papua, and Timor Lorosae. All through the 1990s, civil society
groups insisted that the state start to accept responsibility for this partic-
ular form of gendered violence. The press and many average Indonesians
observing the 1998 violence noticed that there was an eerie resemblance
between what was happening at the time and previous attacks on women
during the 1965–1966 events. As a result, women activists lobbied for the
creation of an organization that would focus on basic human rights of
women alongside the Indonesian Commission for Human Rights that is
called KOMNAS HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia).
In this article, I focus on some of the strategies developed by Komnas
Perempuan to address the plight of the 1965–1966 victims. By 2005,
many of the women survivors were elderly and had lived most of their
lives as outcasts. Their numbers were dwindling fast and there was a pau-
city of information about them. The main sources about their lives are
interviews recorded by local organizations that try to collect the women’s
stories. Especially after 1998, several of such initiatives emerged all over
Indonesia. Typically, they locate and interview survivors of the 1965–1966
violence to document their stories. For example, a network of organiza-
tions for Human Rights and Women’s Rights in the city of Solo, Middle
Java, called Koalisi Keadilan dan Pengungkapan Kebenaran (KKPK) or the
Coalition for Justice and Truth Telling, collected stories about how the
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victims survived and dealt with the massacres. Their findings are col-
lected in a book and a movie.3
The mandate of Komnas Perempuan is to report gender-based human
rights abuses and create public awareness campaigns for Indonesian soci-
ety. This task is not easy since it requires sustained efforts to highlight
violence against women in the media. From the beginning, one of its
main goals has been to change the pervasive mindset that blames the vic-
tims of sexual violence and makes their plight invisible. This attitude
explains why so few cases are reported to the authorities. The consistent
effort of Komnas Perempuan to inform the public has resulted in the sub-
stantial increase of the number of reports to police from 22,512 cases in
2006 to 259,150 in 2016 and 405,178 cases in 2018.4
Komnas Perempuan consists of multiple partner organizations (called
mitra) that operate on the national, provincial, county, and local levels.
These partners represent a large spectrum of organizations advocating
and protecting women’s rights. The fifteen commissioners who constitute
its National Board in Jakarta are elected from across Indonesia via a rigor-
ous vetting process that prioritizes their experience in women’s rights
work.
In 2005, the Komnas Perempuan leaders decided to take on the cause
of the victims of the 1965–1966 events, which was a bold and controver-
sial step. Speaking about the 1965–1966 events was taboo and more or
less forbidden. Relying on their networks, Komnas Perempuan identified
122 victims of the 1965–1966 violence for their report. Their final report
contradicted the dominant narrative broadcast by the Suharto regime
over nearly half a century, which blamed the Communists as the sole per-
petrators and villains of the violence. The Komnas Perempuan report con-
cluded that the 1965 Tragedy remained the single most controversial
problem in Indonesian society that continues to cause trauma and dis-
trust among Indonesia’s citizens. It called for the creation of spaces that
allowed victims to pursue their rights to truth, justice, and healing. The
organization decided not to single out individual perpetrators whose
names became known via the women’s official testimonies (Monitoring
Report 176) but to place primary responsibility for orchestrating the vio-
lence on the State (Monitoring Report 178). It pointed to the State as the
power responsible for upholding human rights and the healing of
national life (Monitoring Report 185).
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Officially, Komnas Perempuan is a governmental organization, cre-
ated by Presidential Decree. One of its tasks is to investigate all forms of
violence against women, past as well as present. Its mandate is to fulfill
victims’ right to truth, justice, and redress (Monitoring Report, 21). It also
aims to contribute to the healing of victims (Monitoring Report 175). In
the case of the 1965 victims, this mandate meant that when Komnas
Perempuan accepted to investigate the women’s complaint, it launched a
full investigation into the events that had transpired during 1965–1968.
The women’s report came out five years before its counterpart, the
Indonesian Commission for Human Rights (KOMNAS HAM), revisited the
violence in 2012, producing an 850-page report.5 The Komnas Perempuan
report details the stories of different types of torture and abuse the
women suffered. It concludes that the various ways of abusing the
women constitute crimes against humanity and holds the State responsi-
ble for not acting on national reparation, healing, and the restoration of
victims’ rights (Monitoring Report 11–18). As I will explain shortly, sev-
eral of the strategies the report mentions to address the women’s trauma
are not limited to the 1965–1966 victims but apply to all women victims
of sexual violence.
As other survivors of atrocities, the women felt a burning need to tell
their stories in order to release painful memories and trauma and to pur-
sue a deep yearning to fulfill a deep yearning. While the violence against
these victims was particularly extreme, patterns of vilifying certain
groups within Indonesian society continue to this day. Since new cycles
of violence against women and, for example, religious minorities are
bound to happen, Komnas Perempuan leaders consider it of the highest
importance to expose the underlying roots by detailing the victims’ sto-
ries, as well as to help them cope and overcome trauma.
The 1965–1966 tragedy
In spite of considerable scholarly and secondary literature, the events that
led to the 65 massacres remain unclear. According to the conventional
story, vividly retold by Geoffrey B. Robinson, during a coup attempt in the
night of September 30 to October 1, 1965, six Indonesian army generals
and one lieutenant were kidnapped and murdered (Robinson 2018). When
day broke, the army led by one of the few surviving generals, future Presi-
dent Suharto (1966–1998), took control and issued a statement that
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members of the Communist Party, PKI, had been behind the murders.
Shortly after, army members and civilians started to hunt down those
accused of being Communists. At the time, the PKI party had around three
and a half million registered members and an estimated 20 million
Indonesians were affiliated with the Party via mass organizations such as
the women’s group Gerwani. The vast majority of the victims were ordi-
nary people—farmers, teachers, civil servants, laborers, and artists—with
no knowledge of what had transpired that September 30. As Robinson
observed: “the attack on the PKI and its allies was not based on the pre-
sumption of actual complicity in a crime, but rather on the logic of associa-
tive guilt and the need for collective retribution” (Robinson 2018:7).
While the majority of killings and arrests took place in Central and
East Java, as well as North Sumatra, local populations in some of the
Christian dominated islands equally participated in hunting down Com-
munists (Kolimon et al. 2015). Moreover, on the predominantly Hindu
island of Bali numerous atrocities took place (Hobart 2014). Indonesia is a
multi-religious nation with around 87% of the population professing
Islam. A 1951 law had required Indonesians to identify with one of the
five official religions (Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Hindu, or Buddhist)
on their identity card. However, during the 1960s, especially in rural
areas, many Indonesians combined their faith with indigenous, local ritu-
als. They were called abangan and often placed in contrast to practicing
Muslims called santri. Several Muslim organizations, for example, the
Muhammadiyah fought against the mixing of indigenous rituals with
Islam, aiming to create a more unified, normative form of Islamic prac-
tice. When anti-Communist rhetoric increased, many abangan officially
converted to Islam or Christianity. This move did not save them from
murder or arrest when the anti-Communist purges started (Saptaningtyas
and Dirdjosanjoto 2004). In the majority of Muslim areas, the most ardent
participants in the purification of society were para-military groups con-
nected to local chapters of large Muslim organizations, especially those of
the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Nowadays, the common consensus among
scholars studying this period is that the widespread and synchronized vio-
lence did not erupt spontaneously but that these groups were part of a
systematic and planned military operation. This connection guaranteed
that their actions would go unpunished (Crouch 1988, Kammen and
McGregor 2012, Robinson 1998, Cribb 1990).
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The killings, arrests, and stigmatization of all those connected with
the Left created the foundation for Suharto’s long-lasting authoritarian
regime called the New Order that controlled Indonesia between 1966 and
1998. During that period, research and public debate about the 1965 coup
and the ensuing atrocities were banned. The government created an offi-
cial discourse that gave credit to the perpetrators who had been led by a
self-sacrificing army (Eickhoff et al. 2017). Few of the victims dared to
speak about their experiences openly. Indonesian poet Goenawan Moha-
mad captured the situation with the words “silence produces legitimacy”
(Zurbuchen 2005: 49). Starting from 1984, the government mandated
annual viewing of the anti-Communist government propaganda film
Pengkianat G30S/PKI (The Betrayal of the September 30 Movement) in
schools and on the state television channel, TVRI. According to the story-
line of this film, no blood was shed but the Communist influence on soci-
ety was eliminated during a legal and peaceful operation. It continues to
shape the country’s mindset (Emont 2015, Wargaderedia 2018).
After 1998, Indonesia transitioned from a dictatorship to a demo-
cratic nation. Liberalization of the media allowed for a hesitant public
debate about what really happened during the 1965 events. A younger
generation began to realize the level of brainwashing during their high
school education, where 97% of the students had watched the anti-Com-
munist film. Children and grandchildren of surviving victims and perpe-
trators started to ask questions and interview family members. As a
result, a sense of communal guilt and a desire for accountability slowly
emerged among certain groups, especially among youth linked to Muslim
organizations such as the NU.
Purifying society
Purifying society was one of the main arguments that helped the Army
convince millions of Indonesians to turn on their neighbors, friends, and
even family. Muslim leaders preached that Communists were rendering
Indonesia impure because they were against religion. This theme still
rules. In 2015, Jakarta’s chief of police stated: “Islam and Communism
cannot exist together” (Emont 2015). The idea that Indonesian society
needed purification from anti-religious propagandists gave para-military
groups connected to Muslim and other organizations permission to
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involve in murdering, torturing, and imprisoning at least two million
Indonesian citizens.
Their actions were justified by various fatwas or legal rulings issued
by groups of Muslim scholars across the nation. As early as 1957, a fatwa
declared Communism haram, strictly forbidden. Several fatwas followed
forbidding marriage and other forms of contact between Muslims and
Communists (Khoemaeni 2016). Eradication of the PKI was presented as a
religious duty. Some NU leaders quoted Chapter two (Al-Baqara), verse
191 of the Qur’an to “Kill them wherever you overtake them and expel
them from wherever they have expelled you” (Fealy and McGregor 2012:
121). After the violence began in October 1965, a conference of religious
leaders in Aceh, with a group of military officers in attendance, issued a
fatwa stating that anyone who died in fighting the PKI would be consid-
ered a martyr (Salim 2008: 144–145). Communists were declared atheists
and it was easily forgotten that many of the victims, similar to the major-
ity of the population, were nominally practicing Muslims, Christians, Bud-
dhists, or Hindus.
Due to their gender, women were specifically targeted. Shortly after
the murder of the military leaders, the army started a vicious campaign
of spreading rumors that women members of the PKI-related women’s
organization Gerwani had participated in savage attacks on the murdered
generals. They had allegedly indulged in orgies with the bodies of the
generals, cut off their penises, and danced around naked. According to
fabricated sources, the women had polluted and desecrated the dead bod-
ies. After dumping them in a deep well called Lubang Buaya (crocodile
hole), the women had joined the rebels in a nightlong orgy. The goal of
these stories was to impress on the general public that these women
were barbaric and had broken all the rules of proper women’s behavior:
to be “polite, well mannered, and feminine” (Monitoring Report, 60).
They were the most impure of all.
Australian researcher Annie Pohlman has argued that the new
regime’s ultimate goal was to portray the Communist Party as an organi-
zation that “indoctrinated women in all manner of sexually deviant beha-
viours” (2017: 200). The accusations that Communist women had acted
with sexual license and sadistic violence placed women and women’s
bodies at the center of the 1965–1966 violence. It resulted in widespread
sexual violence against women of all ages accused of being related to the
S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 9 . 3 0 7
N E L L Y V A N D O O R N - H A R D E R
PKI (Pohlman and Saleh 2015, 2016, 2017:201). The stories gathered by
Komnas Perempuan, Pohlman, and others show that in some cases
women remained subjected to such violence for decades.
Under international pressure, by the end of the 1970s, many prison-
ers were released while remaining under strict supervision. However,
women prisoners enjoyed little freedom as many of them continued to
be raped regularly. Village heads and military leaders exploited many as
personal servants and sex slaves. The general population often looked
away, tolerating these acts of impunity, referencing the women’s low sex-
ual morals and the inferior position of former political prisoners. Ex-pris-
oners had the code ET (eks-tahanan or eks-tapol: former prisoner, or former
political prisoner) stamped on their identity cards. This label meant that
their movements were restricted and that they did not have the basic
rights Indonesians enjoy. They could not live among the general popula-
tion and were not allowed to travel freely. Their children inherited this
status, and even their grandchildren could be banned from working in
public service, the military, and the press. Most jobs were closed to them,
and their children were denied education. As Katharine McGregor
observed: “Children and grandchildren of those killed and of political
prisoners in Indonesia were stigmatized in society as being of an ‘unclean
environment’”(2013: 353). Decades later, some grandchildren could be
denied permission to register for the pilgrimage to Mecca on the premise
of being “unclean” (McGregor 2013: 354).
Women's impurity
In her famous work Purity and Danger, Mary Douglas observed that defile-
ment occurs in relation to a systematic ordering of ideas (2002:42). When
groups or individuals do not respect the conventional boundaries set by
society, the threat to the social equilibrium creates forms of pollutions
(Kristeva 2000: 21) Religious systems in particular provide frameworks for
beliefs and practices relating to purity as symbolic expressions (Katz
2005: 109). A large part of the Indonesian population still considers Com-
munism as a disturbance and threat to the social order, especially since
in the mind of the majority it is joined with atheism. Within religions,
upright moral behavior often connects to a high level of purity of the
individuals involved. A 2013 Pew Study Report found that, especially, in
Southeast Asia, more than nine-in-ten Muslims believe that an
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individual’s morality is linked to belief in God, which means that Com-
munists are of low morals.6 Denial to go on the Hajj is one example of
how family connection to an immoral, polluting entity not only prevents
full participation in society, but for a Muslim, can become an obstacle for
religious practice as well.
Considering these Islamic teachings in conjunction with local culture,
these women suffered from a triple layer of impurity, in body as well as
in spirit. The first layer was the label of Communism; the second was the
general population’s assumption that victims of sexual violations are
impure; and the third layer derives from cultural beliefs and religious
teachings about the inborn nature of a woman. Within this frame of ref-
erence, the female political prisoners subjected to rape were impure on
all three accounts. Across Indonesia, a tenacious prejudice prevails that
blames the victim. Many reports published by Komnas Perempuan docu-
ment the mechanisms by which victims of rape are blamed for their
predicament. In many cases a woman is accused of inviting the attack,
even though their attackers are usually in positions of power vis-a-vis the
victim. In the case of the former women prisoners, their supervisors
abused their authority to violate them with impunity after release from
prison.7 Members of their village, neighborhood, and even their own fam-
ily would not interfere assuming that somehow the women had invited
their own violations. When women prisoners shared their ordeal with
their closest family, they would sometimes be asked to leave the home of
their parents or siblings. There are even cases where a husband and wife
both survived years of detention, that the husband refused to accept what
had happened to his wife and cast her out as “a whore and immoral”
(Monitoring Report 157).
The deep-seated prejudices and expectations about women’s proper
behavior are based on an amalgam of religious teachings as well as local
and cultural beliefs and practices. Local culture buttresses the opinion of
women as unclean and of lesser spiritual value. Although gender culture
is not static across the many islands and cultures of Indonesia, classical
texts that remain influential until today teach that a woman has to com-
ply with her husband’s wishes and sacrifice herself for the well-being of
her husband and children (Smith-Hefner 2019).
Sexual slander about Gerwani women ignored religious affiliations
but arose from the deep-seated ideas about a woman’s essential or innate
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nature (kodrat). Many of these ideas derived from classical Javanese texts
written at medieval royal courts that are still being referenced in the Isla-
mic handbooks taught at Indonesian Qur’an schools. They portray a
woman as weak and submissive; her salvation depends on the husband’s
spirituality (van Doorn-Harder 2006: 41–42) According to Muslim feminist
scholar Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir, who teaches at the Islamic University in
Cirebon and is one of the founders of the Fahmina Institute, an Indone-
sian NGO working on gender, democracy, and pluralism from an Islamic
perspective: in Javanese culture, “women’s virtue was judged entirely by
how much pleasure they brought to their husbands’ lives . . . a woman
belongs to her husband. She must surrender her entire life to her hus-
band’s desires” (van Doorn-Harder 2006: 108–109). Local Islamic teachings
elaborate on these convictions. For example, texts that are still widely
used in the traditional Qur’an schools state that God granted men superi-
ority to women in marriage, economics, politics, and knowledge (Anwar
2018:218). Some quote the Islamic Tradition (Hadith), according to which
the Prophet Muhammad once said, “women are men’s prisoners” (Anwar
2018: 221).
Following Islamic Jurisprudence, a woman is impure when menstru-
ating or experiencing other forms of bleeding that need ritual washing.
According to various Islamic interpretations, a state of bodily purity is
imperative for ritual participation. External purity reflects internal purity
and relates to one’s moral agency (Katz 2005). States of minor pollution
occur after bodily functions such as using the bathroom, and need to be
addressed by performing the wudu’, the ritual washing Muslims perform
several times a day before ritual prayers. While the wudu’ involves run-
ning water over one’s limbs, menstruation causes major pollution and
requires a more comprehensive washing ritual. However, based on cer-
tain Hadith texts, Muslim scholars have stressed that the wudu’ ritual also
points at inner cleansing and washes away sin and purifies the body for
the Day of Judgment (Katz 2005: 117–119). The exterior purification of
the body thus points to its internal purity (Katz 2005: 121). According to
Marion H. Katz, “The wudu’ ritual thus becomes a concentrated exercise
in moral regeneration, culminating with a reaffirmation of one’s faith”
(Katz 2005: 125).
Due to their alleged corrupted and decadent nature paired with an
“atheist” mind and a body defiled by rape, Communist women were
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perpetually in a state of pollution. Rape sometimes caused additional
bleeding, causing further pollution. The goal of sexually violating them
was to destroy physical integrity and any sense of morality. They were
made worthless in their own eyes, as well as to society and its institu-
tions, including religious institutions. While not all communities refused
these women participation in worship, some Muslims certainly assumed
that they should not do so. Furthermore, intense feelings of shame and
guilt prevented the women from attempting to participate in public life,
including religion. The label of impurity kept them from performing the
primary method of purification, ritual washing. This could have severe
consequences, as in some cases, decades later, grandchildren could be
prohibited from the Hajj, a ritual that can only be performed in a state of
purity. Some Muslim leaders even teach that an impure state prevents
entry into heaven.
One of the survivors, Ibu Astuti, describes this state of limbo as
follows:
They tortured us, the women PKI, with sexual abuse, it was sexual
abuse against us. They attacked us by destroying our morals, our
dignity as women. As women, we became worthless because they
destroyed [our dignity], trod on it, we were worthless after that. We
were made worthless! People thought that [about us], society
thought that, that’s what it was like! Normally, we’d be worth
100%, but things turned a complete 180 degrees. We weren’t valu-
able to other people any more (Pohlman and Saleh 2015: 70–71).
The fabricated discourse about the Communist women that the army
created during the 1960s was the preamble to what later became official
conservative gender ideology of the Suharto regime. Indonesian feminists
called the ideology “state ibuism,” “state motherhood.” It taught that
women existed to serve husband and nation. It rested on traditional ideas
of womanhood, upholding the ideal that the family was the basis of state
and society in which women were subordinate to men. During the 1950s,
PKI-related Gerwani women had been the most active in advocating the
rights of women within the marriage, at the workplace, and when seek-
ing education. Even Suharto’s predecessor, Sukarno, struggled with Ger-
wani women forcing them to subordinate their agenda that focused on
empowering women to the nationalist project (Smith-Hefner 2019: 85). By
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vilifying Gerwani members, Suharto also succeeded in linking the idea of
women’s political activism with sexual and moral depravity (Wieringa
2002: 281, Pohlman and Saleh 2012, 2017). This move not just rendered
these women unworthy members of society but also brought other
women organizations in line. Suharto’s regime ended in 1998, but nowa-
days, the label of “Communist” continues to be a powerful tool to dis-
credit women activists.
However, during the 1990s, the writings of influential Muslim femi-
nists such as Riffat Hassan and Amina Wadud became available in Indone-
sia, and religiously based feminist ideas percolated through civil activist
groups into newly founded women’s studies departments at universities
across Indonesia. Muslim feminists started to study primary and sec-
ondary texts to learn about human rights, gender equality, and the influ-
ence of religion and culture. They reinterpreted the Qur’an and other
authoritative texts to empower women. Christian feminists did the same
with the Bible. These ideas and activities created a growing cohort of
scholar activists who realized the importance of exposing the gender
aspects of the anti-Communist atrocities. It was impossible to understand
“the violence itself and its legacy for Indonesia,” without taking into
account the role of sex and gender (Pohlman and Saleh 2015, 2017: 205).
Using different channels such as op-eds in the press, classes at Islamic
universities, and civil rights organizations, Muslim feminists started to
develop alternative interpretations of the Qur’an and the tradition to
counter prejudiced teachings of women’s secondary nature (Anwar 2018,
van Doorn-Harder 2006). Women’s agency is derived from concepts such
as becoming a servant of God (‘abd) and the practice of correct doctrine
and worship (ibadah). Women’s independence comes from observing vir-
tues such as sincerity (ikhlas), God-consciousness (taqwa), and righteous-
ness (salihat) (Anwar 2018: 227). This focus on practice and worship
requires the performance of ritual prayers five times a day, including the
ritual washing or wudu’. To activists, it appeared unthinkable that any
woman would be denied participation in the ritual worship based on
misogynist ideas of purity.
Accountability and responsibility
After the fall of Suharto, several initiatives emerged to encourage
national healing and to demand that the numerous human rights
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violations during the New Order regime be revisited (Kimura 2015: 77).
On March 15, 2000, the president of Indonesia and long-time chair of the
NU Abdurrahman Wahid issued a personal apology for the murders of
1965–1968 (Eickhoff et al. 2017: 449). However, his apology was not trans-
lated into concrete initiatives. Those responsible for the violence have
never been prosecuted, let alone punished. Army leadership has pre-
vented any legal recourse for the victims. The Indonesian equivalent of
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission that held public
hearings about human rights abuses failed. In 2004, a body called The
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was launched, but despite the
reality that “pressures for transitional justice have appeared both exter-
nally and internally,” the Commission was abolished (Kimura 2015: 90).
When in 2014 Joko “Jokowi” Widodo became president, activists hoped
that there would be serious attempts to redress past wrongs and again
requested an apology from the state. During an official ceremony, which
commemorated the slain generals, Jokowi explained why this was not an
option: “Apologize to whom?” he asked, “Who should forgive whom
when both sides claim to be victims?” (Emont 2015).
One of the pressing questions facing the Komnas Perempuan leaders
remains what type of solutions can satisfy the victims of the anti-Commu-
nist purge. Part of Indonesia’s younger generation is asking similar ques-
tions. A sense of intergenerational guilt confronts them with issues of
fairness and equity (Baumeister et al. 1994: 251). Although they are not
directly responsible for the atrocities, their mindsets were shaped by prej-
udices that allowed the acts of aggression to take place and could make it
possible that similar episodes of violence happen again. Their proof was
the 1998 riots. They are also drawing a direct line to recent trends of
decreased religious tolerance that have led to lethal attacks on groups
labeled as deviant, such as the Ahmadiyyah and Shi’ite Muslims (McGre-
gor 2013: 358). Communists were called “deviant” (sesat) as well. Whether
or not members of their family were involved in the 1965–1966 Tragedy,
the cloud of an unaddressed history of violence hangs over the lives of
the younger generations.
Philosopher Iris Young has suggested that in cases of historical injus-
tice in which a state refuses any form of accountability or responsibility
and when many of the injured parties are no longer alive, it is preferable
to apply what she calls the “social connection model of responsibility”
S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 9 . 3 1 3
N E L L Y V A N D O O R N - H A R D E R
(Young 2013: 178). This model does not assign blame or fault but aims for
social reformation and policy reform. Similarly, anthropologist John
Borneman defines reconciliation as a departure from violence (Borneman
2011:61). But in current-day Indonesia, violence against women continues
to saturate society. Therefore, this reconciliation has not yet happened.
Truly diminishing various forms of violence against women would
require a social revolution. Minimally, it calls for changes to mindsets
that are biased against women, an exercise that will take several genera-
tions.
Young’s social connection model is helpful to understand the basic
approach of Komnas Perempuan, which seeks to create new social struc-
tures and to restore a woman’s dignity on the basis of women’s experi-
ence. Helping women regain their dignity and self-worth is the first
objective, with changes to prevailing ideas about women’s intrinsic sec-
ondary status to follow from that. First, Komnas Perempuan seeks to
empower the victim and to encourage victims to support each other. But
it also looks for opportunities to translate local ways into changes for
women’s rights in the legal system. Local cultures and conditions provide
resources for the oppressed. Despite their focus on victims, they do not
ignore state institutions and political actors, whose impunity encourages
continuity and repetition. For example, in the border area between
Malaysia and the province of Kalimantan, a Komnas-related group found
that the local army leaders were the main facilitators in trafficking young
girls.8
The women victims of 1965–1966 were allowed to tell their stories
for the first time in any detail in the Komnas Perempuan report of 2007.
Their testimonies and memories provided tools for an entire new genera-
tion of Indonesians struggling with their status as members of an impli-
cated community. Memory and storytelling follows the model suggested
by John Borneman, which outlines four modes of accountability in order
to refigure the losses: (1) retribution, (2) restitution/ compensation, (3)
performative redress (for example, apologies), and (4) rites of commemo-
ration (Borneman 2011: 3). In Indonesia, performative address and rites of
commemoration remain the most feasible. However, every year the orga-
nization mentions newly found information about “unsolved impunity”
in its annual reports. Komnas Perempuan also has worked with various
governmental agencies to guarantee medical care for the victims. It refers
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to the 1965–1966 data as it continues building programs to prevent
torture.9
Concerning the 1965–1966 women victims, Komnas Perempuan’s
main strategy seeks a form of rehabilitation that is not just based on jus-
tice or monetary compensation, but involves the rehabilitation of the
women’s humanity. Supported by a cohort of Indonesian Muslim, Chris-
tian, and other feminists, Komnas Perempuan seeks to lift the stains of
shame and impurity by challenging conventional discourses and preju-
dices about women. For this exercise, they refer to feminist works that
deconstruct and reinterpret traditional misogynist texts. The reeducation
of the public, of men and women, is one of their express goals. In the
end, it is not society that purifies the women, but the women purify each
other as well as themselves. They regain their voice by supporting each
other. They find the strength to hold up a mirror to society, in which the
perpetrators see themselves, realizing that they are impure, rather than
the victims they defiled. Nina Nurmila, Professor of Gender and Islamic
Studies at the State Islamic University (UIN) in Bandung, and one of the
Komnas Perempuan commissioners expressed this new reality in a meet-
ing with me on June 22, 2019: “Of course, the victims are always pure. It
is the perpetrator who is impure!”
In their testimony, many of women who fell victim to the anti-Com-
munist purges speak to their intense experience of shame, which forced
them to avoid the main streets of their villages and neighborhoods and
to walk through the fields instead of having to deal with hateful looks or
gossip from the neighborhood. Regaining their voice was a breakthrough
they did not imagine possible during their lifetime. Their autobiographi-
cal accounts accelerate and continue to appear.10 Their voices are finally
heard, most powerfully attested by the Dialita Women’s Choir organized
by survivors of 1965 repression, who were awarded the Gwangju Prize for
Human Rights for their contributions to “showing the path of reconcilia-
tion and healing through music” in May 2019 (Dipa 2019). They received
this prize mostly for helping to remove the stigma of impurity from
these victims of 1965. Their personal plight for women is being translated
into campaigns for greater justice and accountability and provides impe-
tus to educate a younger generation in finding new understandings of
the rights of women on the basis of religious texts.
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Notes
1. http://www.komnasperempuan.or.id/
2. https://web.archive.org/web/20000920073842/http://www.serve.com/inside/digest/dig86.htm
3. For more information about the book and the movie see: https://www.spekham.org/men
emukan-kembali-indonesia/ [accessed June 24, 2019].
4. Komnas Perempuan, “Labirin kekerasan terhadap perempuan: dari perkosaan berkelom-
pok hingga femisida ( femicide), alarm bagi Negara untuk bertindak tepat. Catatan kekerasan
terhadap Perempuan tahun 2016. Komnas report. (Jakarta, March 7, 2017) 10.
5. Only the executive summary is available: Ringkasan eksekutif: Hasil Penyelidikan Tim Ad
Hoc Penyelidikan Pelanggaran Ham Yang Berat Peristiwa 1965–1966. http://lama.elsam.or.id/
downloads/861153_Ringkasan_Eksekutif_Penyelidikan_Peristiwa_65.pdf
6. The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. https://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/
30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-morality/ [accessed June 24, 2019].
7. C.F. Komnas Perempuan 2005, “Sistem Peradilan Pidana Terpadu Yang Berkeadilan Jender
dalam Penangan Kasus Kekerasaan Terhadap Perempuan,” Jakarta.
8. Interview with Ose, Interim Director of the K3JHAM group in Semarang, June 11, 2016.
9. Interview Komnas Perempuan Vice-Chair Yunianti Chuzaifa and Commissioner Mariana
Amir ud-Din, June 24, 2019.
10. https://www.spekham.org/menemukan-kembali-indonesia/ and https://tirto.id/ikhtiar-kebe
naran-dan-rekonsiliasi-kasus-65-di-solo-dan-palu-dczY [accessed June 24, 2019].
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